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I. Self-writing-as-other
A little over a year ago, former Notre Dame Linebacker Manti Te’o, 
a college football star considered a favorite for the Heisman Trophy, 
underwent a grueling ordeal of public humiliation. After seeing Te’o 
suffer the death of both his grandmother and his girlfriend and then 
go on to lead his team to victory, everyone in America who cares 
about college football was both empathetic and impressed. But soon 
an inspiring story of perseverance and emotional strength became 
a twisted fable of the pitfalls of living and loving online: pulpy, 
embarrassing, and difficult to comprehend. It turned out that Manti 
Te’o’s girlfriend, Lennay Kekua, was not real. [1] 
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Te’o and Kekua met on Facebook. Their relationship grew over Twitter 
and text message, and over the phone. Although she had a voice 
and a picture and a personality, the woman Te’o had fallen in love 
with, whose death he’d grieved, was not what could traditionally be 
referred to as “a person.” She was a character, invented by a male 
acquaintance of Te’o’s, Ronaiah Tuaisosopo.
Of course, when the whole mess was revealed—ostensibly as much to 
Te’o’s surprise as anyone else’s—a lot of people had a lot of questions. 
Was Manti a liar? Was he gay? Had he been playing the public for 
their sympathies, or did he really have no idea that Lennay Kekua 
did not exist? The talk shows went wild speculating as to the various 
nefarious desires and deceptions that had led to the construction of 
such a sensational illusion. 
Setting aside Katie Couric-style nosiness, Te’o’s story warrants 
consideration as an example of the risks and potentials of love and 
intersubjectivity as they exist in life online. While Tuaisosopo’s 
fabrication caused significant emotional chaos for himself and Te’o, 
it’s nonetheless possible to approach what he did with empathy, and 
from this perspective, certain questions emerge. What happens when 
relationships are born as much through text- and image-mediated 
interaction as through face to face contact? What social circumstances 
led Tuaisosopo to such a project, and what possibilities was he seeking 
to open up? The amount of life we live through various modes of 
digitized, textual interaction has the capacity to make it more possible 
to actualize an imagined, desired version of oneself, even when that 
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version is very far away from who one is in the non-mediated world. 
But what happens to subjectivity when it is decoupled from bodies? 
As far back as Cyrano de Bergerac, people have been living as fantasy 
selves through writing, taking advantage of the opportunity to 
engage in relationships not as strongly tied to their physically, socially 
situated identities. It’s not a new phenomenon, and it’s not a digital 
phenomenon, however, the potential for such fantastical relationships 
is both increased and complicated by the contemporary operation of 
social media. 
In her book Giving an Account of Oneself, Judith Butler (2005) argues 
that my “I” comes into being only by speaking to another, to “you,” 
and by the imperative that your presence poses to me: that is, to give 
an account of who “I” am, and thereby find a way to speak as myself. 
Butler writes, “…the ‘I’ that I am is nothing without this ‘you’ and 
cannot even begin to refer to itself outside the relation to the other” 
(p. 82). With each sentence I construct, I conjure a “me” that can say 
something to “you.” Without this interaction, “I” would not exist.
One place where it may be uniquely possible to take control of this 
moment of self-assertion is in the context of correspondence. In his 
later writing and lectures, Michel Foucault (2005) discusses what he 
terms “technologies of the self,” a collection of processes of “soul 
training,” intended to bring one’s desires and oneself closer together 
(p. 55). The practices Foucault describes in this context can be inserted 
into the formative scene of address that Butler outlines to enact a new 
kind of creative agency in self-formation. Letter-writing is an example 
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of a “technology of the self,” as Foucault discusses it. [2] In his essay 
“Self Writing,” (1997) he argues, “The letter one writes acts, through 
the very action of writing, upon the one who addresses it, just as it 
acts through reading and rereading on the one who receives it” (p. 
216). The self takes shape through the eyes of another and a capacity 
for self-creation emerges from within that relationship. 
Foucault’s understanding of the self-shaping capacity of correspondence 
when taken together with Butler ’s socially contingent self, provides 
a model for the location and cultivation of agency in the context of 
subjectivization.  Te’o, as the “other” at the scene of address, presents 
the opportunity for Ronaiah Tuaisosopo to take on a new “I,” separate 
from his “self,” to become Lennay Kekua, while remaining Ronaiah. 
Foucault’s “self writing,” is the process of forming and sculpting 
the self by writing to another. Tuaisosopo’s interaction with Te’o we 
could describe as “self writing as other,” as he builds and actualizes 
a new, separated from him-self through correspondence. 
However, when correspondence takes place on Twitter, rather than 
through private letters or e-mails, different variables come into play. 
The heightened sociality of this forum and the continuous collective 
negotiation of subjective position and identity entailed can add to 
the potential to create a new self that functions in the world with 
a fully realized, social identity. But it also places the means for 
identity determination partially in the hands of an uncontrollable 
collaborating public.
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II. Fantastic self-creation in fiction and social 
media
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler draws from Foucault’s writing 
on technologies of the self because he also argues that the fractured 
nature of the self can be addressed via language. A “technology of 
the self” is precisely that, a technology: a productive process that one 
enacts on oneself in order to shape one’s subjectivity, or one’s capacity 
to speak as oneself (or as any self). Foucault (1986) speaks specifically 
about the practices associated with the “care of the self” in Hellenic 
Greece, explaining that Stoic philosophers such as Seneca and Marcus 
Aurelius wrote letters as a part of their practice of self-care, building 
close relationships, and enacting a process of self-examination. He 
writes, “there developed an entire activity of speaking and writing in 
which the work of oneself on oneself and communication with others 
were linked together” (p. 51). The “other” in these exchanges is not 
an abstracted other, as in the psychoanalytic scene of address, but a 
specific other whose identity matters, with whom one interacts in 
real, experienced life—either a teacher or a close friend (Foucault, 
2005, p. 54). The nature of these specific relationships also affects 
the nature of the practice. In the process of writing to someone, the 
self takes shape before the other’s eyes and, in a sense, through their 
eyes, as a kind of apparatus. It is not a process of purging secrets or 
uncovering buried desire, but of training and self-sculpting, it is a 
creative process, what the Stoics called “tekhne tou biou,” or “the art 
of living” (p. 178). 
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We can imagine that Tuaisosopo did not choose Manti Te’o at random 
to be his interlocutor, although it is unclear whether Lennay Kekua 
was created specifically to facilitate conversation with Te’o or not. 
Nonetheless, the invention of Lennay not only made it possible 
for Tuaisosopo to have an intimate relationship with Te’o, but his 
relationship with Te’o—its apparent depth and intensity—also made 
Lennay possible. Functioning as a productive technology of selfhood, 
it brought her into being. 
Writing on Foucault and subjectivity, Simon O’Sullivan (2012) 
describes the practices that are a part of the “Care of the Self” as 
serving “simply to increase our capacity to be” (p. 72). Considering 
the self as “practiced,” in Foucault’s terms, Butler ’s “account” 
functions as a phenomenon through which we can produce our own 
subjectivities continuously as we interact with others, and language 
is what makes this radical self-creating agency possible. This space of 
invention exists all the time, but can be approached in more and less 
intentional ways. Ronaiah Tuaisosopo’s creation of Lennay did make 
it possible for him to be differently, for a time, but it also had dire 
consequences. How can certain kinds of text-based relationships be 
engaged with so that they serve to increase our capacity to be without 
such fallout?
Understanding and activating this kind of fantastic agency in 
subjectivity requires looking at how our text-based relationships have 
consequences, good and bad, on our being. Text-based interactions 
present particular possibilities and particular problems for self-
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creation, or finding a way to speak as oneself. Considering Twitter 
and Facebook in the context of “The Care of the Self,” it appears we 
are all perpetually writing ourselves through the gazes of hordes of 
imagined others. The knowledge of those potential observers shapes 
what we say and who we are. This dynamic of me, thinking about 
you, thinking about me is similar to the relationships Foucault writes 
about in the context of “The Care of the Self,” except on Twitter, we 
are not engaging in an intentional process with carefully chosen 
interlocutors, as Marcus Aurelius and Seneca were, rather we are 
more often seeing ourselves through the eyes of the unkind masses, 
creating an ever more clearly delineated space for our subjectivities 
to occupy. And we can sense everyone else doing the same thing. 
This sense of watching and being watched can be exhausting. Another 
invented subjectivity of a kind, @Horse_ebooks, was a Twitter-based 
art project that for years was thought to be just a particularly genius 
algorithm, producing randomly generated brilliance in inhuman 
quantity. When it was revealed that @Horse_ebooks was the work of a 
couple of conceptual artists, the Internet was shocked and saddened. 
[3] Writing in The New Inquiry, Rob Horning (2013) argued that 
@Horse_ebooks was appealing because it presented a break from the 
awareness of perpetual collaborative self-crafting that social media 
engenders. In the cacophony of reflexive subjective observation, 
when similar practices to those at work in “The Care of the Self” are 
performed for the public rather than in the safe confines of intimate 
relationships, the result can be an alienation so deep that the only 
consciousness we feel we can trust is that of a computer—an entity 
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not reflexively performing itself, or determining our performances 
of ourselves with its gaze. We want to turn that operation of self-
creation off. 
It’s clear that these mutually constituting, correspondence-based 
relationships when engaged with en masse can be as limiting and 
determining as they are liberating. Just as Twitter made it possible for 
Lennay Kekua to exist, it also uncovered the deception that created 
her. For epistolary exchanges to have the potential to “increase our 
capacity to be,” interlocutors must be carefully chosen and the process 
must be undertaken intentionally.  While the complexity of living 
via social media might make it more possible for an invented entity 
like Lennay Kekua to be animated as a social subject, for Tuaisosopo, 
just as for Seneca, it was more specifically in the space of the dyadic 
relationship that the most capacity for self-invention emerged.
The epistolary novel-from-life I Love Dick, by Chris Kraus (1996) can 
serve as an example of how the semi-fantastic social space can be 
activated to enable a more fluid lived experience of subjectivity. In 
I Love Dick, Chris Kraus is the author and Chris Kraus is the main 
character. The story is told primarily through the letters that Chris 
writes to Dick, which are documents of an actual correspondence. 
Through writing to Dick, Kraus carves out a new position from which 
to speak. Chris explains to Dick that she used to be unable to write 
in the 1st person because she felt that, quote, “In order to write 1st 
Person narrative there needs to be a fixed self or persona.” Through 
her one-sided correspondence, she’s found that, as she says, “There’s 
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no fixed point of self but it exists & by writing you can somehow chart 
that movement” (p. 139). 
She has to make her way to this subjective position, which is fluid 
and changeable, through a relationship that is not quite grounded 
in the day to day, and must exist in text because it’s based on 
imagined intersubjectivity. Dick almost never writes back. She creates 
her desired subjectivity by intentionally fictionalizing the scene 
of address, bringing the imagined thoughts of Dick into her own 
thoughts. While the fact of Dick’s existence is essential, his actual 
engagement is unnecessary. 
As Butler argues, we are only anyone in conversation with others, and 
I Love Dick shows how that dynamic, when it is taken to a fantastical 
and fiction-infused place facilitated by text-based correspondence, 
can be used to find a more sure-footed position from which to speak 
as oneself. Counter-intuitively, this stability might come when one 
finds a way to accept the fractious nature of one’s “self,” as Chris 
does, and as Tuaisosopo, perhaps, did not have the opportunity to do. 
III. Coping with subjectivity
Further considering Tuaisosopo in contrast to Kraus, it’s necessary 
to ask what changes when this subjectivizing social dynamic is used 
to create a separate “me” that is entirely distinct from the facts of 
Interface / Volume 1 / Issue 1 / Theorizing the Web 201410 /
my identity as I live it with my embodied self. Butler, Foucault and 
Chris Kraus all work from the assumption that the self is in motion. 
It’s a process, and not a composed entity. And while this might be 
experientially true, and feels personally true to me, it’s not actually 
the pervading idea of “self” that most of us must grapple with in our 
day-to-day lives.  We generally must be some one, and disruptions 
in that public coherence can cause great difficulty. What’s more, once 
some major alteration is made, a new identity, even if it fits better, can 
have its limitations as well. 
Lauren Berlant, in her book Cruel Optimism (2011), discusses the 
“fantasy” of personal sovereignty as lending itself to a “militaristic 
and melodramatic view of individual agency by casting the human 
as most fully itself when assuming the spectacular posture of 
performative action” (p. 96).  Berlant argues that this imperative 
towards the consistent performance of a sovereign self becomes a 
burden on our being (p. 102-5). Creating a new, distinct, and parallel 
self like Tuaisosopo did can help alleviate this burden, but because 
of what it means for any one to “be themselves,” it can also create a 
rift that’s difficult to sew back up. Online, in hyper-social spaces like 
Twitter, it is possible to make a new, fantastic “I”, and to employ the 
animating power of fiction in the social world. But the same qualities 
that make this self-invention possible, a fill-in-the-blank kind of 
personhood that requires only a picture and a few friends to get 
started, also demand a perpetual negotiation of identity, a continuous 
public self-assertion that might exacerbate the very imperatives that 
lead to the necessity for escapist avatars.  
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Berlant discusses attachment and desire in a way that takes our 
own capacity for choice and agency within those desires as multi-
directional, marked by practices of, as she writes, “self-interruption, 
self-suspension, and self-abeyance … that indicate people’s struggles 
to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their 
life-making activity has been cast” (p. 27). Ronaiah Tuaisosopo used 
Manti Te’o, in a sense, to take an extended break from himself as 
a unified entity. While this is a dramatic example, it’s possible to 
identify all kinds of more innocuous ways we find to take breaks 
from the performance of our “selves.”
Berlant argues that instances of “interrupted agency” are at work 
in what she calls “scandals of the appetite,” including food, sex, 
smoking, shopping and drinking, that are bodily desires individuals 
struggle to master, but find they cannot for myriad reasons (p. 102). 
Of course accepting that the performance of one’s sovereign self is a 
burden doesn’t necessarily mean becoming an alcoholic. Hellenic care 
of the self is a process meant, in part, to stop such “scandals of the 
appetite” from impinging on personhood (Foucault, 2005, p. 265). In I 
Love Dick, Chris Kraus lets a moment that would appear as a scandal 
of the appetite—the desire for sex outside of her marriage with a man 
who doesn’t want her—expand into what we could consider a novel-
length moment of suspended agency, in which a new relation with 
agency is established. This happens through language, specifically 
text, and through fiction.
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Lauren Berlant (2011) writes that in instances of imagined 
intersubjectivity, “The speaker [becomes] more or differently possible, 
because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, 
as, and to, two—but only under the condition, and illusion, that the 
two are really (in) one”(p. 26). Maybe it feels better to be as two, or as 
many, than to be just one, but there has to be something pulling these 
things together, to be in one. Ronaiah Tuaisosopo living as Lennay 
Kekua did not have this precarious unity. 
While I don’t know very much about Tuaisosopo, and am not in a 
position to draw conclusions about his life and desires, I do know 
that Tuaisosopo who, like Te’o, comes from a religiously and socially 
conservative, Mormon Samoan community, [4] created the identity of 
a beautiful young woman in order to make it possible for himself to 
forge an emotional connection with another man, someone he would 
otherwise have not been able to interact with in the same way. But 
what was Lennay Kekua? She had a life: Manti Te’o has memories 
of speaking to her and loving her, and as Lennay, Tuaisosopo found 
intimacy and companionship with Te’o. What happens when the 
self-creating potentials of letter writing in the context of fiction are 
brought outside the space of literature to run wild in actual life, as 
sometimes happens on social media? 
This kind of situation emerges from the same operations of self-care 
and self-creation that Seneca and Marcus Aurelius engaged with, 
and fiction is used in a way similar to how Chris Kraus uses it, to 
embrace a fractured “I” while nonetheless finding a way to occupy it. 
/ 13 When I Write You... / Stuhr-Rommereim / Winter 2015
However, the direction being moved towards is not a more coherent 
relationship with oneself. The kind of fantasy-living facilitated by 
social media, as in the case of Lennay Kekua, emerges as an essential, 
if desperate, coping mechanism in the constant struggle to exist as a 
sovereign self, to find intimacy not afforded by one’s bodily existence 
while, in this case, staying within a specific community and its norms. 
Instead of negotiating a new position from which to speak and act, 
Tuaisosopo simply split himself in two, and social media facilitated 
that rupture. It can be read as a kind of last-ditch response to the 
strain of self-sovereignty. 
The process Kraus undertakes allows her to continue to occupy 
her identity in a way that feels better. She makes herself “differently 
possible” (Berlant, 2011, p. 26) and “increases her capacity to be” 
(O’Sullivan, 2012, p. 72) without breaking herself into pieces. Chris 
Kraus was able to find a way to house a fractured “I” within her 
“self,” but Ronaiah’s Lennay, set loose in the mediated world, took 
on a life all her own, she stopped belonging to him, and wreaked 
emotional havoc on everyone she encountered. 
In one way or another, however, we all need relief from self-
sovereignty. Social media can be a kind of hyperreality, where life 
is like a lucid dream. The burden of this self-sovereignty might be 
felt more acutely, but the possibilities for its release are also greater. 
For better and for worse, in this space there is an incredible amount 
of agency in who one lives as, but unifying these various selves and 
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lives can pose a challenge. The possibilities go deeper and are more 
consequential for our being than we might realize. 
Notes
[1]  See Deadspin (2013), “Manti Te’o’s dead girlfriend, the most heartbreaking and 
inspirational story of the college football season, is a hoax,” http://deadspin.com/
manti-teos-dead-girlfriend-the-most-heartbreaking-an-5976517.
[2]  For a succinct outline of Foucault’s conception of technologies of the self, see 
Foucault, M. (1993), “About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self: Two 
lectures at Dartmouth,” Political Theory, 21(2), 198-227.
[3]  See S. Wanenchack in Cyborgology (2013), “Unfortunately, as you already know, 
people,” http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2013/09/25/unfortunately-as-
you-probably-already-know-people/.
[4] In an essay for The Atlantic, I. Gershon (2013) wrote in detail about the Lennay Kekua 
story in the context of the Samoan-American community, “The Samoan Roots of the 
Manti Te’o Hoax,” http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/01/
the-samoan-roots-of-the-manti-teo-hoax/272486/. 
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